Showing posts with label security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label security. Show all posts

Sunday, May 31, 2015

Why Roll-Up Summary Requires Master-Detail

There's an idea that is 7 years old on the Success Community titled, "Eliminate Need for Master-Detail Relationship for Roll-ups", and users have voted the idea up to over 25,000 points.


I won't lie. I am most likely one of the 2,500 users who voted in favor of the idea, who thought I can't believe a no-brainer like this is still an idea and not a GA feature!

But today, while watching Who Sees What: Record Access Via Sharing Rules I suddenly realized that the reason for the delay could actually be ridiculously simple: Implementing this feature would violate the security design of the Salesforce1 Platform. How? By exposing information that would otherwise be hidden when OWD is set to "Private".

Scenario: VIP bank accounts


Let's say you're a system administrator for a fictitious financial institution called SaaS Bank. At SaaS Bank, there are everyday customers, and then there are VIP customers. VIP customers at SaaS Bank are high-profile individuals of great importance or great wealth, and a few notable VIPs include Barack Obama, Warren Buffett and Marc Benioff.

Understandably, VIPs get the white glove treatment. Their relationships are discretely managed by handful of bankers in the Private Bank department within SaaS Bank. These bankers are known as Private Bankers, and their number one priority is protecting their client's sensitive data, namely the clients' bank accounts and balances.

Data on customers' bank accounts are stored in a custom object labeled Bank Account, and all bank accounts serviced by SaaS Bank are tracked in this object.

The security requirement: Everyone at SaaS Bank should be able to see that a VIP is indeed a customer, but only Private Bankers (and their trusted colleagues) should be able to see the bank accounts held by a VIP.

The simple solution would be to make the Bank Account custom object private using OWD. And to relate Bank Account records back to a customer (i.e., a standard Account record), the object has a Lookup(Account) field, not a Master-Detail(Account) field.

The tricky requirement: All users want to see aggregate balance data for their customers.

So, if you could create a Roll-Up Summary field on the Account object that sums all balances for a customer, you would violate the private sharing model for the Bank Account object. A Roll-Up Summary field holds a value that is calculated based on all pertinent records.

In a private sharing model, how would... how could the Roll-Up Summary field hold a value that simultaneously shows 0 to a regular banker, the total balance to a Private Banker and something in between to other bankers with whom a Private Banker has manually shared records? The answer is it can't.

Objects with Master-Detail fields inherit the record access controls on parent objects. In this case you can present aggregate information on parent records via Roll-Up Summary fields, because if you have access to the parent record you also have access to all child records. But when you use a Lookup field instead because you need different record access for child records, well...

Okay, I get it, and I still need a workaround


I think there are legitimate reasons why an organization would want aggregate data to be automatically calculated and displayed through a Lookup relationship. There are two ways to work around this:
  • Ignore the built-in security constraint and leverage Apex running in system context to perform the roll-up. You can even use an off-the-shelf solution the free Declarative Lookup Rollup Summaries app or the paid Rollup Helper app.
  • Use a custom visual element (e.g., Visualforce page) to display a contextual roll-up, taking into account the current user's access to child records. This would leverage the with sharing keyword to accurately display different values to different users.

In the end, it would be nice of either of the above options were made into native features. And I'm guessing that the first option, the convenient and intentional deviation from an established security model, is what the 2,500 supporters of that 7-year-old idea want.

Who Sees What: Record Access Via Roles (Corrected)

I'm admittedly a bit disappointed in the Who Sees What: Record Access Via Roles video. When I first read about the Who Sees What series, I thought it was awesome that salesforce.com decided to produce visual aids on the topic of security. As an alternative to the Security Implementation Guide, which boasts over 100 pages of official documentation on Salesforce security, I expected the videos to demystify the flexible and nuanced security controls available to system administrators.

However, after watching the Record Access Via Roles video, I feel that almost 70% of the content within is either misleading or simply inaccurate.

Note: I spent significant time staging test cases in an org before deciding to write this blog post, so please let me know if any part of my writing is technically wrong.

2:10 Three ways to open up access? Not quite...


In the AW Computing scenario, the presenter says that access to private Opportunity records can be opened up in one of three ways, quoted below:
  • "No access. In essence, this maintains the org-wide default of private. Users in this role would not be able to see opportunities that they do not own."
  • "View only. Users in a role can view opportunities regardless of ownership."
  • "View and edit. Users in a role can view and edit opportunities regardless of ownership."

This sounds good in concept, but as the video progresses to the demo portion to show how the three ways are actually implemented, the problem becomes clear. The presenter is actually misconstruing and wrongly explaining the Opportunity Access options.

In reality, the implicit access granted through the role hierarchy automatically solves the requirement presented in the video, and the Opportunity Access options are completely irrelevant to the hypothetical situation.

A more accurate explanation


Let's assume that the role hierarchy is set up as implied by the visual at 1:40 in the video.



Alan can see and edit whatever opportunities Karen and Phil can see and edit. The two reasons are that Alan is above Karen and Phil in the role hierarchy, and that OWD for the Opportunity object is configured to grant access using hierarchies (which as of Spring '15 you still cannot disable for standard objects). There are no more granular controls for records owned within a subordinate chain. If Karen can see a record, Alan can see that record. If Karen can edit a record, Alan can edit that record. Access via subordinates in the hierarchy is that simple.

So what do the Opportunity Access options do? Simply put, the options do exactly what the Role Edit page says they do.


Opportunity Access options have nothing to do with roles and subordinates. The selected option comes into play in situations, such as ones involving account teams, where a user from one branch in the role hiearchy owns an account, but a user from a different branch owns an opportunity for that account.

Try it yourself


Admittedly this will be really difficult if you don't have access to a sandbox org or a Partner Enterprise Edition org, but here's the idea.

Your role hierarchy looks something like the following:
  • CEO
    • SVP Products
      • Product Sales Manager
    • SVP Services
      • Services Sales Manager

Configure Opportunity Access for all roles in the hierarchy so that "users in this role cannot access opportunities that they do not own that are associated with accounts that they do own."

Set OWD for Opportunity to "Private", then do the following:
  1. Log in as a Product Sales Manager
  2. Create an account
  3. Create an opportunity
  4. Log in as a Services Sales Manager
  5. Verify that you cannot see the opportunity
  6. Create a new opportunity on the account owned by the Product Sales Manager
  7. Log in as the Product Sales Manager
  8. Verify that you cannot see the new opportunity created by the Services Sales Manager
  9. Log in as the administrator
  10. Change the Opportunity Access for the Product Sales Manager role so that "users in this role can view all opportunities associated with accounts that they own, regardless of who owns the opportunities."
  11. Log in as the Product Sales Manager
  12. Verify that you can now see the new opportunity created by the Services Sales Manager
  13. Verify that you you cannot edit that opportunity

Saturday, May 30, 2015

Salesforce SSO in 5 Bullets

For my own edification, I want to summarize single sign-on options with Salesforce as succinctly as possible.

Using non-Salesforce credentials to get into Salesforce


This scenario can be simplified like this: A user already has a username + password combination stored in another system. The user wants to log into Salesforce using that existing username and password, instead of maintaining a separate username and password that's used only to log into Salesforce.

To achieve this, Salesforce allows:

Using Salesforce credentials to get into another app


This scenario can be simplified like this: A user is already logged into Salesforce. The user wants to launch another app without having to authenticate again. Instead, the other app should recognize the user and respond accordingly, based on the the user's Salesforce session.

To facilitate this, Salesforce offers:

Closing thoughts


A company can mix the two approaches above, so that Salesforce becomes an intermediate link in a chain that allows access to a third-party app using credentials maintained in a non-Salesforce system.

Monday, April 20, 2015

Surprises with and without sharing in Apex

I'll admit that I never dug too deep into the with sharing and without sharing keywords. At a high level I felt that if I want to enforce security and visibility, I should use with sharing. Otherwise I should use without sharing, which I also assumed was the default.

The Object-Oriented Programming in Apex training module surprised me by telling me that CRUD permissions and field-level security ("FLS") are ignored both with sharing and without sharing! Also, system mode simply means that record-level read and edit privileges are ignored, since CRUD and FLS are always ignored.

This is contrary to what I'd inferred from the Apex Code Developer's Guide, which writes, "In system context, Apex code has access to all objects and fields— object permissions, field-level security, sharing rules aren’t applied for the current user." My interpretation of this statement was that on the flip side, when with sharing is applied, "object permissions, field-level security, sharing rules" would all be applied for the current user.

It was a bit hard for me to believe that Apex would not respect CRUD (if not FLS) permissions, so I created a Visualforce page to test this in my org. And it seemed to me that indeed, an Apex controller created using the with sharing keyword would allow a user without the Delete object permission to delete a record. Crazy... am I missing something?

Well! What's more interesting was that with a standard controller, CRUD permissions are always observed with actions like delete(), regardless of whether an extension class is defined with sharing or without sharing. For example, a button that invoked the StandardController.delete() action would automatically be hidden if a user didn't have the Delete object permission. Furthermore, if a custom action in the extension class invoked the standard controller's action, the custom action would also be subject to the user's CRUD permission, generating an "insufficient privileges" error.

So, I guess the way to enforce CRUD is to use standard controllers, which I don't think is always feasible, especially with mass actions.